Polish Undergrand State and Home Army

The Polish Underground State which functioned under the German occupation in the Second World War was an unique phenomenon in the whole history of European resistance movements.

In 1939, the territory of Poland was occupied and carved up between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Then, the outbreak of the German-Russian war in 1941, meant that the entire Polish territory was overrun by the Germans, whose long-term aim was to exterminate the Poles. Occupied Warsaw, the Polish capital, remained for Poles the centre of their underground political life. Here in September 1939 was formed the Polish Victory Service (SZP), an underground political-military organisation which was the embryo of the subsequently developed underground state.

The Polish Underground State grew, and reached its most mature form in 1943-44. The highest authorities in this state were held by the Government Delegate at Home, in 1944 this was the deputy premier (of the acting government, in exile in London). The Government Delegates were, successively, Cyryl Ratajski (pseudonym "Wartski"). Jan Piekalkiewicz (ps. “Julianski”), Jan Stanislaw Jankowski (ps. “Soból”), Stefan Korbonski (ps. "Zielinski”).

The underground parliament was a representation of the most important political parties and groupings (the Political Consultative Committee – the Political Representation at Home) which in the period 1944-45 took the name of the Council of National Unity (RJN). In the underground parliament the more important political parties were represented: the Peasants’ Party (SL), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the National Party (SN) and smaller groupings. The Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) remained outside this parliamentary set up, refusing to recognise the constitutional Government of Poland and was not only wholly dependent on Russia, but also represented that state’s interests.

In 1944, at the side of the Government Delegate’s Office was the Home Council of Ministers (KRM). The Government Delegate directed the work of the Government Delegate’s Office at Home which comprised 18 departments which corresponded to the Government-in-Exile’s ministries in London. The Delegates’ activities encompassed , to the extent that conditions of enemy occupation and terror allowed, all areas of organised society. First and foremost, this was secret education provided at every level – primary, secondary and higher. Secret courses were organised at the underground universities of Warsaw, Kraków (Cracow), Wilno (Vilna) and Lwów (Lvov). A very important influence on public opinion was also exerted through propaganda disseminated by the underground press. In general, throughout the entire wartime period, about 1500 different titles appeared. In addition to this, an underground administrative apparatus capable of undertaking work at the moment of restoration of an independent Polish state was organised.

The most important, however, was the Home Army (AK), the backbone in the struggle with the occupant. This armed force, evolved from SZP, through the Union of Armed Combat (ZWZ), to reach its apogee as the AK. This constituted an integral part of the Polish Armed Forces (PSZ) and remained under the overall command of the Polish Commander-in-Chief who remained abroad. The successive commanders in the SZP-ZWZ-AK chain of development were General Michał Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz (pseudonym “Torwid”), General Stefan Rowecki (ps. "Grot"), General Tadeusz Komorowski (ps. "Bór"), and General Leopold Okulicki ("Niedzwiadek”).

At the top of the command structure was the Home Army High Command (KG AK) which consisted of seven staff bureaus and miscellaneous specialist units and detachments. The territory of Poland, in its interwar shape, was divided into areas and regions, each of which had its own scaled down version of the KG AK. The chief task of the AK was to prepare and execute a general uprising in Poland coordinated with the Allies in the final phase of the war, which would liberate Poland from the occupant in one fell swoop. The on-going struggle concentrated on self-defence (freeing prisoners and hostages, defence against pacification measures), and striking at the occupant’s apparatus of terror (the physical liquidation of Gestapo and SS functionaries). These activities were conducted by a special combat department known as the Diversionary Directorate (Kierownictwo Dywersji) – Kedyw for short, under the command of Colonel August Emil Fieldorf. Besides this special partisan detachments were created, designed to train soldiers for the coming uprising through small scale on-going skirmishing.

As a result of the unification of the various underground military organisations, the AK finally emerged in 1944 as an umbrella organisation for a national military force of over 350,000 soldiers. The intelligence work of the AK in a wide area of Europe was of capital importance to Allied strategists. Among other achievements, the production centre of the V1 rocket was pinpointed and essential V2 parts were won and passed on to London. Psychological warfare was also waged, in which Action "N" was mounted to create the illusion of an internal German opposition movement to Hitler.

The AK single-handedly liberated a number of places from German control. The Warsaw Uprising, due to a lack of Allied support, collapsed after a 63 day battle. In the face of the resumed Soviet offensive of 19 January 1945, the AK was dissolved. The civil authorities of the Polish Underground State followed suit in July 1945. AK soldiers suffered repression from the Russians either through the Moscow-controlled Polish communists, or directly at the hands of the NKVD (the Russian security police service)
List of confirmed sabotage-diversionary actions of
the Union of Armed Combat (ZWZ) and Home Army (AK)
from 1 January 1941 to 30 June 1944
Source: Bohdan Kwiatkowski, Sabotaż i dywersja, Bellona, London 1949, vol.1, p.21


Sabotage / Diversionary Action Type
Totals
1
Damaged locomotives
6 930
2
Delayed repairs to locomotives
803
3
Derailed transports
732
4
Transports set on fire
443
5
Damage to railway wagons
19 058
6
Blown up railway bridges
38
7
Disruptions to electricity supplies in the Warsaw grid
638
8
Army vehicles damaged or destroyed
4 326
9
Damaged aeroplanes
28
10
Fuel tanks destroyed
1 167

Fuel destroyed (in tonnes)
4 674
11
Blocked oil wells
5
12
Wagons of wood wool destroyed
150
13
Military stores burned down
130
14
Disruptions of production in factories
7
15
Built-in faults in parts for aircraft engines
4 710
16
Built-in faults into cannon muzzles
203
17
Built-in faults into artillery missiles
92 000
18
Built-in faults into air traffic radio stations
107
19
Built-in faults into condensers
70 000
20
Built-in faults into (electro-industrial) lathes
1 700
21
Damage to important factory machinery
2 872
22
Various acts of sabotage performed
25 145
23
Planned assassinations of Germans
5 733

Marek Ney-Krwawicz, Warsaw
(Translated from Polish by Antoni Bohdanowicz)

the effectiveness of partisan war was measured by number of troops necessary to police occupied territories as well as in psychological effect on occupying forces. 

The material losess as well as  body counting is of secondary importance.

The "Bear" wrote;

"The number of troops in norway or france e.g. had nothing to do with partisan activities, but with it's strategic positionand to avoid an allied landing. The number of troops in Poland had as well nothing to do with partisan activities, but Poland was a refreshment area for the eastern front."

Yes! Those Polish girls are very cute!

I assume that is what you alluded to and called "refreshment"?

Ron

Edited by opuslola - 28-Jan-2014 at 18:36

The general problem with partisan warfare, may it has been in Poland, the Soviet Union or the balkans or even the western theatre is, that many people just focus on the "succesful" missions and the number of killed enemies or destroyed vehicles or on grenades, which did not work cos of sabotage.
What they don't take into account is the brutalisation of warfare, the increase of civilians victims and of course the consequences for the society itself. Partisan warfare generally causes a reaction of the occupants. In the SU e.g. the germans weren't able, due to a lack of troops, to controll wide areas besides their runways. The areas between these runways were later usually controlled by Soviet partisans, from which they started missions against supply lines. The germans therefor started with a policy of dead zones. The population was, if they did not clearly support the germans, often deported for forced labor or killed, the villages burned down. The Soviet partisans themselves punished people they classified as collaborateurs with extermination and burned down their villages. They even looted villages to get food or forcibly recruited people.
The Polish resistance was as well not only directed against german police and military, but as well against collaborateurs, like the blue police. But the different resistance groups as well used denunciation to the germans to weaken competiting resistance groups. In the later phase of the war some AK units and the right NSZ even worked together with the germans against the Soviets and soviet and jewish partisans.
Even in the west partisan activities caused civilians losses, because disinhibited, frustrated and brutalized soldiers took revange and these revange was too often addressed against innocent people or at least civilians.
In the Czech republic e.g. the massacre of Lidice hadn't happened, if British and Czech politicians hadn't decided to assassinate Heydrich to cause a nazi retalliation against Czechs, which would help to strengthen a Czech resistance, which was nearly not existent till the end of the war.
So if people look at resistance movements, at partisan warfare, they have to take into account both, wins and losses.

I supposed the said AK accomplished to show that they hadn't given up, and made a statement. This is all that can be accomplished sometimes...just to show that one's will is not broken; and if the people who did it consider it worthy to sacrifice their lives over it, so be it.

As for the civilian loses, it is not known if those civilians wouldn't lose their lives anyway, after all the Nazis weren't the most civilian-friendly guys on the block. The idea that with trying to be neutral one will save one's life, and one's family's life, in the reality of a war in which all Polish people, being Slavs, were by default considered inferior and sooner or later to follow the fate of the Jews,is, IMHO, a self-deceipt.

Edited by Don Quixote - 31-May-2014 at 04:18

Originally posted by Sarmata Should the AK have waited for the Soviets to take control of the city then the Soviets would not be able to install there communist regime as easily they had or if at all would be able to if the London backed AK would stand there ground then.

This is a good thought, but I doubt this would happen. Besides, Eastern Europe would be given to the Soviets anyway, this was a political decision, not a result of the Soviets overwhelming Poland or any of the other countries there. Do you think the rest of the Allies would fight USSR over Poland?

Edited by Don Quixote - 01-Jun-2014 at 02:54

I don't know about that. What kinds a better deal you can have with a "partner" that doesn't honor any deal they make? The Russians don't believe in diplomacy, nor in compromises, the only thing they understand of is brute force.

Poland was a victim of geopolitics, I believe. It was squished between Russia and what became Democratic Republic of Germany; so there wasn't any chance that the Soviets would let it go, since they aimed for a monolithic block of land as a cushion against the west /or at least this was the excuse for its post WWII landgrab, not to mention that Russian ambitions in Poland are date from like 2 centuries before the discussed events/. The only way in which that would be possible was going to bat over it, IMHO. Russia may have felt pestered by a well organized Polish army, but that only would make it more determined to break it down.



Edited by Don Quixote - 02-Jun-2014 at 00:15