[Article] - Athens and Empire c.479-446 BC

"Athens and Empire - to what extent was Athens between c.479-446 BC an Imperialist power?"
By Sam Edwards/Aster Thrax Eupator

       I.            Introduction

 The legacy of high classical Greece, for all its cultural and intellectual significance, concealed a politically troubled people which, by the end of the 5th century BC were to become embroiled in one of the most brutal and extensive conflicts the ancient world had yet seen. The Peloponnesian war of 431 - 404 in many respects was the logical culmination of two peoples, holding immense political and military power, but were almost diametrically opposed societies with radically differing cultural views. The "cold war" of the c5th century BC between Athens and Sparta and their respective leagues is eerily reminiscent of the period before the first world war and of the early cold war, and is more relevant than ever in that it provides perhaps one of the earliest case-studies ever of the growth and mentality behind imperialist and expansionist states. Despite the inherent complexity of the question addressed – “to what extent was Athens imperialistic?” there is no doubt that between them, the two power-blocs of the Delian and Peloponnesian leagues show a striking continuity in the way which the empires rise, and the rhetoric that is utilised in their construction. However, it must be stressed that even the term “Peloponnesian war” was essentially a synthesis of two wars in the historiography of Thucydides, and thus, the idea of this period as one cohesive conflict is merely retrospective. The imperial legacy of Athens, especially, is historically and archeologically rich; the effects of which are directly evident in the architecture of most modern European cities. To understand the cultural, intellectual and political legacy of Athens, one must first understand her essentially expansionist role in the world of 5th century Greece

    II.            Athenian military imperialism

 In 1832, Clausewitz stated that “…war is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument”[1], and history has proven this maxim to be true and especially relevant to this period.  As Shipley reports, “…war is often said to have been central to Greek society”[2], which can be seen as early as Homer. Empires are perhaps built by war; and Athen’s was foreshadowed by one of the most famous. The Persian wars (c.499-479) unified Greece against the Archenemid enemy. However, this idea of Greece being unified against a Persian enemy has been largely proven to be due to Herodotos’ idealistic depiction of the situation – historians such as Cartledge, emphasise that Herodotos was a “man of the east”, and would have thus, because of the Persian occupation of Ionia, would have been more likely to see the Hellenic league as being beneficial in Ionic terms, rather than to sow the seeds of later discontent. Historiographically, this “east-versus west” thesis can be seen in popular works such as Tom Holland’s “Persian Fire”, which is subtitled “…the battle for the west” – in the light of popular research, therefore, one should not look at Greece politically in the Persian wars in this essentially neo-classist view – she was clearly not unified even at the time of the Persian wars[3]. There is a myriad of evidence to reject this traditional interpretation, and the seeds of discontent can be seen in the 481 meeting of the “Hellenic league”, which Buckley states that it resolved all feuds “…between member states should come to an end”[4], but that “…the command of both of the army and navy should be conferred on the Spartans”[5]. Athens contradicted this by its construction of its fleet, which, by the calculations of Connolly (deduced from both Herodotus and Aeschylus) numbered 380-310 ships[6]. The end manifestation of this “imperialism” was seen in the Peloponnesian war (431-404) which - Thucydides reports - was instigated by “…the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta”[7]. Between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars is the “Pentecontaetia” of Thucydides, which is a period ample in examples with which to examine the supposed military “imperialism” of Athens.

The transition from league to empire was slow and arose from military actions against Persia. The Athenian statesman and ardent traditionalist Kimon returned from Thrace to attack the Persian-held Eïon (477). Meiggs considers this suspicious, because “…Athens captured and occupied a strong coast-fortress…rich in timber and silver”[8]. However, Plutarch states that the Persians at Eïon had been “Harassing the Greeks in the neighbourhood”[9]. It is unlikely that these early actions were imperialistic, especially taking into account Meier’s belief that in this period “There is no indication that, apart from Sparta and Argos, any of the prominent cities…were involved in major wars or expansionist policies except in their own vicinities”[10]. The only references to an Athenian “empire” come later, from the c.454 tribute lists.  Thus, Eïon could be seen as a continuation of the Persian war. Later campaigns seem distinctly different – most of them were against Greeks who did not join the Delian league, such as Skyros (473-474), Karystos (472-1), Naxos (469) and Thasos (465-463). Thucydides states that these were because of “…failures to produce the right amount of tribute or the right number of ships”[11]. Meiggs’s statement that “Athens was already forging the fetters with which she would bind her allies”[12]  in retrospect seems valid. Thasos requested Spartan aid, which never came; probably because of an earthquake and the Messenian Helots’ revolt (c.465-461). Rhodes maintains that this occurred because “Athens and Sparta had not yet quarrelled”[13], perhaps showing that Greeks saw a division between the Peloponnesians and Athenians this early. However, early Athenian campaigns were not all against Greeks; for example, the battle of the Eurymedon river (466), which Meiggs called “…the most brilliant success of Kimon’s life”[14], where he gained control of Lycia from the Persians. However, such a battle, that “…probably marked the end of the Persian satrapy which Darius had formed in 513”[15], would surely mean that the requirement for the Delian league was over? Overall, however, we can conclude that between 479 – 469, Athens was not imperialistic, but the conditions for it were clearly created by Kimon under the guise of a new Hellenic impetus to unify against the Archenemid Persian threat.

After 462, the campaigns changed; mainly because of the rise of the new “imperialist” politicians in Athens. After Kimon’s offer to aid the Spartans in their helot revolt in c.462 was rejected, Athens, disgraced, ostracised Kimon and thus, his pan-Hellenism. This resulted in what Croix called the “first Peloponnesian war” (although Souza maintains; “to some extent it lacked the continuity and coherence which is characteristic of a single war”[16]). It may be hard today to see why Athens reacted so scornfully to an insult, but Kagan reminds us that in ancient warfare, “The real motives were often psychological…rather…than practical; that is, they derived from questions of honour and prestige”[17], whilst Croix states that the insult was “…unparalleled…in the whole of Greek history”[18]. Athens, contradicting the conditions of the Delian league, was fortified in c.459, which is clearly indicative of these changing policies. Croix gives us three reasons why the war occurred. Firstly, the Athenian alliance with Argos and Thessaly, against whom Sparta fought several battles; at Tegea (473), Dipaea (471), and Tiryns (468-7). So naturally, Athen’s alliance with Argos in 462 was a threat. Souza further emphasises the “imperialist” results of this, as it gave Athens access to excellent cavalry[19]. Secondly, the occupation of Naupactos by Athens and Messenian Helots (462-459) dominated Peloponnesian commerce, and between 453-446, surrounding Achean states were pressed into the Delian league. Thirdly, there was the Athenian alliance with Megara, which gave access to both the Corinthian and Saronic gulfs by its ports Pegae and Nisaea. Thucydides states that this was why “…Corinth began to conceive such a bitter hatred for Athens”[20], and Kagan believes that this was inevitable: “An alliance with Megara, therefore, would promise Athens enormous advantages, but would also bring Corinth and probably with Sparta the entire Peloponnesian league as well”[21], and Corinth’s anger certainly reinforces this. Meiggs believes that Sparta “…was soon compelled to fight for her position within the Peloponnese”[22], showing a conscious Athenian move against the Peloponnesians. However, Powell tabulates the Athenian with the Spartan campaigns, creating “the theory of Spartan opportunism” – for almost all Athenian campaigns between 465-411, there is a Spartan counterpart[23], and Powell emphasises that Athenian operations in the Aegean clearly threatened Persia and were therefore not imperial actions. Moreover, Didodorus Siculus recounts[24] that by 475-4, Sparta considered taking command of the Persian offensive from Athens by force – which again can be seen to reinforce the idea that Athenian military “imperialism” – even against the Spartans – was reactionary, and this can be used as evidence to suggest the existence of a “war party” in Sparta as early as the 470s.  However, Powell’s judgement[25] relies mainly on examples from after 446. Soon, war commenced with Corinth, who saw the control of Megara and Naupactos by Athens as intolerable, causing several battles – Halieis, Cecryphalea and Megara between 459-458. Athens moved to control the Saronic gulf, and forced Aegina to join the Delian league in 457-6. However, the old anti-Persian campaign continued, and Kimon continued to fight Persia by aiding the rebel Inaros in Egypt (c.459-454). Thus, there was clearly a change in warfare from the rise to power of Perikles in 462, who Plutarch states decided that “…to hold the Spartans in check was one of the prime objectives…and set out to oppose them in every way”[26]. To conclude, it would seem that after 462 we see a clear approach to “imperial” campaigns, but when we consider Kimon’s continuation of the Persian war, the author considers the “middle view” advocated by Hammond, who talks of “…Athens’ offensives on two fronts”[27], to have the most merit.

War was declared in 460-457, manifested in the battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta (457). Sparta reacted by aiding  Boeotia; opening another front. In retaliation Tolmides lead a fleet to burn the Spartan dockyards at Gytheum in 456. Although Meiggs states that Athens was exhausted[28], she had the confidence to pursue a “land empire”; perhaps because the defection of Megara. The defeat of the Egyptian expedition in c.454 made the Athenians reconsider their approach, leading to the five years truce – and Sparta’s peace with Argos – in 451. Kimon’s return reinvigorated the offensive against Persia, such as the Cyprian expedition (c.450), which was so successful that in 449, peace  was made with Persia. Powell states that “the…basis of the league was being removed”[29]; and therefore that Athens could not masquerade her conquests as being for the Delian league. Croix maintains that Athens could have argued that the next Persian king could have broken the peace, so that the continuation of tribute was necessary[30]; thus tribute after 449 would not be imperialistic. However, with this peace much of Athens’ Boeotian conquests were abandoned, and Tolmides’ attempts to regain them resulted in his defeat at the battle of Koroneia (447). Megara rejoined Sparta, allowing the Spartan king Pleistoanax to besiege Athens. Consequently, Perikles agreed to the 30 years’ peace (446), which, according to Hornblower, was Athens’ triumph because it “recognised the existence of the Athenian naval empire”[31]. In conclusion, we can see an almost chronological increase in Athenian imperialism from 479-446, and it is the period between 462-446 that obviously heralded the most extreme and adventurous Athenian campaigns. In military terms, Athens was now clearly an empire.

In conclusion, Athen’s military imperialism can be divided into three main stages – the first period under Kimon immediately after the Persian wars, that may been seen as a continuation of the Persian offensive; the second, after Kimon’s ostracism in 462, in which, although we see Perikles’ imperial ambitions manifested, efforts against Persia are still being pursued; and the first Peloponnesian war, in which military action, as a political “instrument”, to quote Clausewitz[32], is now utilised almost exclusively for Athenian Imperialistic purposes

 III.            Imperial economics

Any attempt to integrate the essentially modern concept of economy into that of Ancient history will be problematic. The dominating theorem of modern scholarship, as emphasised by the “Columbia school”, is that of “substantivism” in this context, that Ancient economics was merely an extension of social status and class rather than a sphere in its own right – in Weber’s words, the ancient man was a “homo politicus”[33], who merely pursued economics as a medium through which to exercise political power – the behaviour of the “Homeric Hero” in some respects can be seen to typify this obsession with status, rather than safety, which in many respects can be seen still reflected in recklessness of economic ventures in this period –  almost all of which were exclusively geared for war. A very basic piece of evidence to emphasise this point is the fact that Aristotle, who intended to catalogue and write about all areas of “episteme” or the Greek divisions of knowledge, does not include “Oikonomikos” (economics) as a separate work, but includes what we would consider to be “economics” in his “politics”. However, although one must maintain scepticism when working with the ancient economy, especially when regarding the lack of sources (there are merely four in-depth major references and explorations of land ownership in Greek primary sources spread over the classical period) and the work of the Columbia school and Finley, a traditional approach, as seen below, shall also be attempted. The best way to simply summarise Athenian economic attitudes between c.479-404 without the influence of the Columbia school would thus be that “A polity’s will for power beyond its borders grows relative to its appetite for foreign resources”[34] – despite the fact that what we regard as “economics” was only really born with Alfred Marshall’s “Principles of economics” in 1890, the concept of ancient economics should still not be ignored, especially for this thesis. The extensive military operations that characterised 5th century Athens must have required a strong economic basis, despite the consensus of historians such as Buckley, that “the basis of Athenian imperial power was its fleet”[35]. However, we must take into account that Greek cities were also essentially autocratic – despite the extensive trade links with eastern Greece, Phoenicia and Egypt that clearly existed from as early as the Mycenaean period, we cannot consider trade to be a basis for such economies. Furthermore, Zimmern  states that “…a bad system of coinage made foreign trade almost impossible”[36]; and thus any Greek state with a reputable currency could have dominated over time, as Athens did. Kagan emphasises the importance of Athen’s location in relation to her imperialism – “…its area of about a thousand square miles is mountainous…and unavailable for cultivation, early Attica was relatively poor”[37]. How, from a “relatively poor”[38] city, Athens was by the 5th century to become (as Rhodes says) “…not merely the most prosperous Greek city but one whose prosperity took a form which made it…supplied with ready money”[39]?

Although the main method of Athenian expansion was military force, others were explored. In 482, Themistokles persuaded the Ekklesia to use the revenue from Laurium Silver mines to construct a navy. When Meiggs states that Themistokles “…contributed more than any other single man to the making of Athens into a great state”[40], he is referring to the construction of the naval ports of the Piraeus rather than the walls of Athens. The fleet was immediately put to “imperial” use – Plutarch states that Themistokles “…incurred the hatred of the allies by sailing round the islands…trying to extort money from them”[41]. Plutarch continues – “In the first place he [Themistokles] was the only man who had the courage to come before the people and propose that the revenue from the silver mines at Laurium…be set aside and the money used to built triremes”[42], implying that there was a latent support for such policies. Zimmern gives a fascinating socio-economic explanation for this, stating; “It was by free gifts that the Athenians armed the fleets which were so supreme on the seas”[43], in which he refers to the cultural generosity of the Greeks, or “Xenia”. Zimmern also emphasises that this is why what he calls “municipal socialism”[44]was never occurred, because of the “dislike…for discipline and organisation”[45], which, although questionable, would explain why Athenian imperialism was individualistic – it was not a faceless venture by a nation-state; it could not be in such a small community. Indeed, many citizens were expected to “patron” a vessel, and were known as “Trierarchs”, which reflects this obligation – this kind of support for the mobilisation and arming of the fleet was primarily done via the medium of the pseudo-religious “Leutourgia”; a religious element can thus be strongly detected (is it any coincidence that the Delian league treasury was moved to the Acropolis and the “adyton” or second chamber of the Parthenon?), granting yet more kudos to the now orthodox “substantivist” argument upheld by Finley. Thus, many of the reasons behind the creation of the economic background for the large military ventures of the c5th century in Athens may be seen as a mere reflection of the militaristic culture and associated honour that would come from such an act – not the economic ramifications of it, as Finley states, the “…institution of wage-labour is a sophisticated late comer”[46], and thus the loyalty of Athen’s men-at-arms was not essentially economic, but moral and cultural – arguably more virulent encouraging factors. However, from a more abstract standpoint, the reputation of Athenian coinage meant that some states, such as Aegina from c480 may have used Athenian currency voluntarily – Finley argues against any such point (admittedly, evidence for the c480 coinage act is fragmentary, and so we must understand the difficulties that Finley faces) on the basis that, if it was conceived to give Athenian merchants advantages over their clients, the act would have provided benefits for all – even subject states – within the Athenian empire, and so the decree must be regarded as a means of political control[47]. However, if this was the case, why, as stated above, did foreign states outside of Athenian control decide to use it? The answer can only logically be in an appreciation of the silver standard of Athenian coinage – coinage was not, as Finley maintains, utterly irrelevant in the ancient world; why in that case would Sparta have preferred using the Persian Gold Daric, with all of the resources of the treasury at Persepolis to increase its value, if coinage was irrelevant to the workings of the ancient economy? Thus, the removal of any economic basis for imperialistic ventures seems admittedly to be an extreme position. Furthermore, as we see in the rebellions of Skyros (473-474), Karystos (472-1) and Naxos (469), Athens would not allow member states to leave the Delian league; possibly because of the real value that the leagues’ treasury gave to Athenian coin. This can be seen in the rebellion of the Thasians (465-463), whose gold mines were used by Athens. At the same time, Athens also founded a Thracian colony – later called Amphipolis – on a major trade location. We can argue against overt “imperial” decisions, however – Zimmern’s statement that a “fiercely isolationalist” [48] Greek state must “…feed and clothe itself in its own way”[49] surfaces when we consider that Athens was unable to do this, so to some extent her “empire” (grain was imported from Egypt and the Black sea (c.459-404)) may have been inevitable. Cook emphasises the isolation of Greece – “For ordinary loans and rents 12 per cent a year was normal, with interest paid monthly. Maritime rates were 33 1/3 per cent for four months to compensate for…shipwreck…”[50], obviously, in such a distrustful economic climate, Athens would have to stimulate confidence through force. Thus, economic imperialism seems limited in this period. It would seem that long-term socio-economic conditions from c.600-479 sowed the seeds for events in c.479-446. Thus, Hammond’s view, that “by the middle of the century Athens was winning a place…in the expanding world of Greek commerce”[51] thus seems plausible, but through necessity. Although one can argue against many of these economic interpretations via the “substantivist” position of Finley, the fact remains that there are many campaigns throughout the c.460s especially that clearly show an overt interest in the ramifications of Athenian imperialism on her economics, and something of this kind must have been on Kimon’s agenda in this period.

In this period, Periklean economics are perhaps the most famous. After the failure of the Egyptian expedition (459-454), the treasury of the Delian league was moved from Delos to Athens, possibly from a renewed fear of the Persians. Soon after the battle of Eurymedon (c.469) Delian league members changed their tribute from ships to gold – in many respects, this may have given the Athenians the pretext to transfer the treasury to Athens (454), but interestingly, this is not mentioned by Thucydides, who may not have regarded it as provocative. Scholars are unsure if this was an “Imperial” move by Athens, but the sixteenth tribute to Athens and projects such as the Parthenon (c.447-432/1) can be considered evidence enough. The Parthenon especially is testament to the economic legacy of Athens in this period – unlike contempary Doric temples, all ninety-two metopes were carved – an amazing architectural feat which could not have been achieved were it not for the “…immense financial backing available” [52], in the words of B.F. Cooke. Furthermore, the draconian measures taken by Perikles in the creation of the Athenian imperial fleet cannot have been even conceived without a conscious appreciation that Athens alone could not afford the financial burden, and Jones gives us just a sample of the immense cost of imperialism – “Perikles is stated to have kept sixty triremes in commission for eight months in the year and he maintained a fleet of 300 in the dockyards. The dockyards must have given employment to an army of craftsmen, as well as to 500 guards, and the crews of the cruising triremes would have numbered 12’000 men, paid a drachma a day"[53]The contempary response can be seen from Plutarch - some Athenians complained “we are gilding and beautifying our city…with costly stones and statues and temples worth millions of money”[54], to which Perikles’ response was the Athenians had “…every right to use the surplus income”[55]. The Athenians organised this new tribute system with a care that could only be instigated by a realisation of their economic power. Control mechanisms of empire are clearly in place, as seen on the tribute lists*, where we find the cities of the league arranged in five provinces (Caria, Ionia, Thrace, Hellespont and the islands), committees created – “Logistae”, “Hellenotamiae” – to audit tribute, and the “Phrounarch” – a tribute official (who soon disappears from Athenian tribute lists around c.460-459). Much of this information comes from a decree from Ephyre, (c.453-2), which Rhodes states “…In a strict sense could be represented as a colony of Athens"[57], who reinforces this by evidence from Plutarch: “…a council of 120…to be established by…Athenian overseers and a…garrison commander”[58], and additionally, the provision of Athenian magistrates, who in the case of Chalkis’ revolt (446-445), were able to help regain control through lawsuits. Also important were the “Kleuarchies” or colonists, who dominated the local economies, and were sent out in relatively large numbers – “1000 settlers to the Chersonese, 1000 to Thrace…”[59].  These colonists were undoubtedly of importance – the much later play by Aristophanes, “Wasps”, mentions garrison duty in Byzantium[60] – it is hardly coincidental that Byzantium was a major city on the Hellespont, through which Athens gained much of her corn supplies until c.404. We see some of the military actions of this period – such as the presence of a fleet near Pegae in 458/7 – to have economic consequences – as Croix states, “The Nisaea-Megara-Pegae route may perhaps have been used sometimes by merchants trading between Athens and the West if and when the way cross the Isthmus of Corinth was closed to them”[61]. In this case, we could also view the 462 alliance with Megara and Argos as an Athenian action to secure their economic gains. Athens had already dominated the Peloponnesian (more specifically, Corinthian) pottery trade in the c.7-6th centuries, as can be seen by the dominance of Athenian black-figure ware in the 6th century. However, Croix cites Cook’s warning “…against overestimating the value of trade in painted pottery and its importance in the economic life in any Greek city”[62]. However, one can dispute with both Cook and Croix when one considers that the artistic – and thus commercial – legacy of Athens had reached Italy as early as the c.530s. Athens had a long history of attempting to dominate traditionally Peloponnesian trading routes; the foundation of Thurii by Athens in Italy (c.446/443) and her treaty with the Sicilian cities (c.443) dominated the grain routes from Sicily and indeed, the initial causes of the Peloponnesian war – the Megaran decree and the Corcyran alliance (433-432) – were both fundamentally concerned with trade. However, de Croix argues against the latter point[63], but this has been considered wildly revisionist[64] and as can be seen above, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence to suggest the commercial/economic reading of these events. Current scholarly consensus can be summarised by Antonaccio, who states that “…the Greek experience of colonisation cannot be said to have participated in the kind of imperialism that operated in other times and places…Greek colonies were not put in place to claim territory…or to secure resources to the state, or with any of the other justifications of imperial expansion in history”[65] – although there was clearly a strong ethnic relationship between the colonists and their “Metropoleis” or “mother-city”, most colonies soon developed into a cultural mix, and in many respects became utterly independent, as can be seen by the revolt of Epidamnos from Corinth (c.433 BC). Athens was no different in following the trend of colonisation in the Archaic period – Osborne calculates that in the last generation of the 8th century BC, a new colony was being founded in Italy or Sicily by Greeks every two years[66]. Athenian economic “Imperialism” can thus be considered non-existent in the archaic period, and thus, Periklean economically interventionist policy in the mid 5th century BC cannot be considered to rely on firm foundations of Athens as an economically imperialist power – such tactics, if they consciously existed at all, were the product of a new approach towards executing and interventionalist policy. Some of the best evidence relies on the fact that by 449, the peace of Kallias – the evidence for which is disputed, however - removed any reason for the Delian league to exist in an economic, military or political form. How this affected Athens is not clear, but Rhodes calculates from the tribute lists there was one year – 449/8 – where tribute was negligible, and two others – 448/7, 447/6 – where tribute was resisted[67], showing that, perhaps, contemparies clearly did see the peace of Kallias as a cue for resistance; the chronology seems to point to some kind of boycott of the league as a political measure. Essentially, with such evidence, it is hard to see how the Athenian “vassals” could not have seen the 454 movement of the treasury as a bid for imperial power. Furthermore, by 446/5, all allegiance on the tribute lists is dedicated towards the people of Athens; Athens has now overtly admitted that the “members” of the Delian league are vassals of Athens – the transformation from league to empire, on an economic basis, is now obvious – Meiggs’s statement that “…there was a general tendency towards closer control”[68] seems an understatement to say the least.

In conclusion, Athenian economic imperialism seems to have been a method of enforcement for the her empire, but the issue appears to be to what extent it was a conscious one. One could easily say that Athens must have realised its economic programme was imperialistic when we regard that throughout the whole of this period, landowning was “the only form of reliable, long-term investment in Greco-Roman antiquity”[69]. Thus, in using the Delian league to gain that land, and thus economic security, she was carrying out an imperialist policy, but one could easily discount this by regarding that the Peloponnesian league was Bi-Cameral – Sparta thus held a great amount of land and thus, initially, potential economic power to rival that of Athens. Attica, a comparatively barren landscape to the Peloponnese, would have forced Athens to resort to her only alternative – to combat Sparta in a potential economic cold war using the Delian league to do battle. In any case, Athen’s economic policy was clearly reactive, and whatever lands she did possess in Attica were consistently threatened by siege in the first Peloponnesian war.  Although initially Athen’s economic policy cannot be considered a conscious act of imperialism, the sources show that in retrospect, it was an aggravating factor for the later Peloponnesian war (431-404), and towards the latter decades of the 5th century, Athens displays a clear understanding of her economic prowess – to such an extent that many historians regard trade to be a decisive factor in the outbreak of that later conflict. Overall, evidence seems to be conflicting and vague, but although simplistic imperialism based on the domination of trade routes and acquisition of gold and silver are plausible, but we must regard Athenian economic imperialism to be at first circumstantial and wholly reactionary, and not psychologically motivated by imperialism, but by the “Columbian” school’s Homeric warrior-status basis. Admittedly, some of the chronological evidence by the mid 5th century as postulated by Rhodes around the time of the movement of the Delian treasury to Athens (454) and the peace of Kallias (c.449) does cater towards the idea of conscious Athenian economic dominance. However, this interpolation in regards to the tribute lists is fundamentally flawed methodology – the tribute lists and the peace of Kallias are essentially manifestations of political and not economic imperialism, and thus we return to the “status mentality” principle of Finley and the Columbian school – Athens was, to conclude, clearly not consciously performing what would now be considered “economic warfare”.