...British Appeasement...??

..and first of all, apologies to gcle2003, Paul, pekau, and The Diplomat for taking so much time in replying to your comments�I have now successfully moved house and pretty much back in the saddle (apart from having to put up with dial-up internet service for a few more days!!!)�

....I must say I have been surprised at the general tone of the replies, insofar that most seem to hold at least some degree of understanding, if not sympathy for Chamberlains� predicament�.i am more used to a torrent of criticism and abuse when the subject is approached�.

�gcle2003 noted that�

..indeed, and this is something that A. J. P. Taylor would have probably agreed with, in fact Taylor viewed the policy of appeasement as successful in preventing a European war during the Anschluss and the incorporation of the Sudeten Germans into the Reich�.. according to Taylor, Munich was �a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life,��..however, appeasement eventually broke down over the Polish issue in 1939�..

..Paul observed that�

�this is one area which proves to be a little bit more trickier than others�.such an opinion assumes and gives credit to a Chamberlain who was perhaps �holding out� until the time was right to declare war?�.however, Chamberlain was probably not stalling for time in a bid to ready England for war by building up reserves�it seems more likely that Chamberlain was looking for �The Appeasement of Europe�, to bring �total peace� to the continent (possibly as a way of countering the believed threat of Communism, and maybe to drive Hitler east into the Soviet Union�.this may have been thought but there is not a scrap of evidence to show this was planned)�

�.the idea that Chamberlain may have accompanied his strategy of appeasement with a gradual build up of British forces in an effort to work towards peace while preparing for conflict, is a possibility�.However, Horace Wilson declared that Britain�s foreign policy was never �designed just to postpone war�the aim of appeasement was to avoid war altogether, for all time.��

.... Chamberlain also had major concerns over weakness in defence�he maintained the belief that even if there was a war, Britain could not win�.The UK�s defence was poor and the budget was limited�more significantly, there was the threat of the �tripartite alliance� between Japan, Italy and Germany�.A combination of threats threat that Britain could not defeat on her own (and remember, there was no sign of America�s willingness to enter the war)�.

�In addition, Chamberlain believed that if war came to Europe, the political and military advantage would go to the Soviet Union (Correct! It did!)�.it appears that he was maybe buying time to eventually conclude a �final, peaceful solution� to the crisis� Munich would suffice for now, but this idea is more securely founded in that Chamberlain was looking for a long term peace settlement�..

�An earlier (or later) declaration of war also assumes that a substantial programme of rearmament had been conducted enabling Britain to produce the resources necessary to enter combat, and indeed, it is possible to suggest that a programme of rearmament could have provided a deterrent against German military and political aggression�.. however, Chamberlain�s view was that an aggressive foreign policy should depend on the ability to deploy adequate military power, and he argued, �you should never menace unless you are in a position to carry out your threats.��..moreover, the cost of major rearmament remained a sticking point for the fiscal minded Chamberlain, financial considerations were of importance to a Prime Minister who felt Britain�s strength lay in a stable economy and that foreign policy should be adjusted to take into account Britain�s circumstances��.as early as 1935 it was conceded by Foreign Office officials that Britain should at least attempt some form of �accommodation� with Germany before Britain embarked on a substantial rearmament programme��. In addition, it was believed in some quarters that a European �arms race� caused the First World War, and that any such policy in the late 1930�s would once again provoke German aggression�..

�gcle2003 notes that..

�..Although Chamberlain did concede rearmament of certain aspects of the British armed forces, it was limited and insufficient with the exception of increases in the Royal Air Force, which only proved effective in the summer of 1940, as gcle2003 has correctly pointed out�.however, for the writers of �Cato,� Chamberlain�s limited military expansion did nothing to deter German occupation of Czechoslovakia and the outbreak of war in 1939�.. Chamberlain appears convinced that he could avoid war, and any increase in defence forces only demonstrates a sensible precaution by a statesman who would have surely faced further contemporary criticism if this course of action were not taken. Even if substantial rearmament was possible, it is arguable whether this would have been enough to deter a confident, post-Anschluss Hitler, who with the help of the Sudetenland Nazi Party was coveting the Sudeten German�s��Moreover, it would have been geographically difficult to mobilise British forces to Eastern Europe�..to labour the point, even if Chamberlain had managed to balance the books and provide a substantial rearming of the British military it is unclear how any deployment of British forces could have prevented German expansion without the help of allies�.???

�.personally, having looked at some of the options available, I tend to agree with the opinion put forward by the historian John W, Young �..�it may have made no difference if Britain had chosen an alternative policy to appeasement, for it seems Hitler was bent on expansion regardless.��..