IGenghis: I would like to add a few of my ideas to your topic with no bias to either side.

From a traditional point of view, the U.S. would be more useful to China as an ally than as a foe, and vice versa.  In my opinion, China's two greatest foes in the coming years will be: 1. Japan 2. Russia.  I also believe that, although the Cold War is over, Russia still stands as a potential threat militarily to the U.S.  It would be prepostreous for the U.S. to worry about the People's Liberation Army of China, because the PLA is even much less capable than the Russian or Ukranian military.  During the Cold War, the Pentagon had plans to use China as a buffer against the Soviet Union.  In case Russia rises economically, the U.S. can always use China as a chip to buffer Russian advancements.  If the United States and China go to war, which is unlikely and detrimental to both sides, Russia will benefit (so will Japan).

Now, let's follow with this unlikely hypothetical situation in which the United States and China do go to war.  China does not have the ability to invade the United States, and at the current rate, never will.  We can thus rule that out.  The United States has the ability to invade China, but at what cost?  I support the idea that millions of troops would be needed to fully occupy a nation that comprises 1/6 of the world's population.  Thus, we can also rule out the possibility of the United States ever invading China.  We can also rule out the use of nuclear arms on either side, because the possession of nuclear warheads by both sides means that neither side would risk using them.  In any case, we safely can rule out the possibility of a full scale war between the U.S. and China.  Genghis, what you proposed about splitting China into warlord factions is both ingenius (good thinking) and preposterous, very preposterous (you have neglected the presence of nationalism, strongly centralized government, and 95% Han ethnic majority in China)

What we have left is the possibility of a small scale regional conflict.  In that scenario, the technological, military, and intelligence advantages will fall heavily on the United States and the Pentagon.   The Chinese military is approximately equivalent of the U.S. military in the 1980s, with almost nothing to rival U.S. forces in terms of air force and navy.  In a traditional military confrontation, the United States will undoubtly possess enough superior technology and intelligence to gain the upper hand.  With the exception of one on one hand to hand combat (no army in the world can defeat the PLA in a hand to hand combat on land), the United States military will certainly destroy the Chinese military.

To be more specific, the United States will probably fully control the intelligence, as well as both air and sea.  China's navy will not stand a chance against its U.S. counterpart.  With full control of air and sea, the U.S. would be able to cripple the rest of the Chinese forces and easily win.

Now, what can China do to counter this seemingly one sided conflict?  In 1999, two colonels from the PLA published an essay on the potential use of asymetrical warfare.   Let us get to asymetrical warfare with an analogy.  The elephant is la arge and powerful animal, it can stamp out virtually any smaller animals in its path.  Nothing can stop it, right?  Yes and no.  No conventional animal that meets face to face with the elephant can stand up to the elephant.  How about a mouse?  A mouse, though not able to stand up conventionally to an elephant, simply needs to climb up the elephant's nose and choke it to death.  The only way for less powerful nations to defeat the United States military in war nowdays is through asymetrical and unconventional warfare, a type of war in which the strong cannot exert its strengths.  I will stop at this junction, because I am not qualified and knowledgeable enough to say more (for more information, do research).

In conclusion, what comes to the end is a battle of minds.

US F-15s Versus Indian Su-30s
by James Dunnigan
October 14, 2004

Discussion Board on this DLS topic

More details have come out about the "losing" performance of U.S. F-15Cs (from the Alaska-based 3rd Wing) against India's air force in the "Cope India" air-to-air combat exercise earlier this year. The Air Force and some members of Congress have used the "failure" of American aircraft to further justify the need for new F/A-22 and F-35 fighters. Some are calling the results a dramatic example of weakening of American air combat capabilities

Two factors have been cited as major reasons why the 3rd Wing took a drubbing. None of the participating American aircraft had the latest long-range AESA radars, although some of the F-15Cs of the Wing had this equipment. A decision had been made beforehand not to send the AESA equipped planes  to  India due to the additional maintenance package required to support them. A total of six F-15Cs were sent to India, each equipped with a fighter data link, short-range AIM-9X heat-seeking air-to-air missiles, and the U.S.'s helmet-mounted cueing system. 

Secondly, at India's request, the U.S. agreed to mock combat at 3-to-1 odds and without the full range of capabilities of simulated long-range radar-guided AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles. U.S. fighters could not use the active on-board radar capability of the AMRAAM, and the missile was limited to around 32 kilometers range and required the use of the F-15C's onboard radar to target Indian aircraft. In standard use, AMRAAM has a range of over 100 kilometers and is a fire-and-forget missile that doesn't require additional guidance from the F-15. Practiced tactics by the F-15 crews mix two AESA-equipped F-15Cs with two stock aircraft. The AESA aircraft take long-range missile shots to thin out and disrupt the formation of a numerically superior force before the two sides close up for closer fighting. 

The F-15s flew in groups of 4 against packages of 12 Indian Air Force aircraft consisting of a mix of Mirage 2000, Su-30, Mig-21, and Mig-27 aircraft. The Mirage and Su-30 aircraft were used in the air-to-air role, while the Mig-27 was used as the strike aircraft with the Mig-21 providing escort to the Mig-27s. The Indians also had a simulated AWACS platform and the use of simulated active radar missiles such as the AA-12 and the French Mica, unlike the F-15Cs. This gave the Indian Air Force a fire-and-forget air-to-air missile capability that the U.S. fighters didn't have, a heavily unrealistic assumption in actual hostilities. 

However, the U.S. pilots admitted that they did have problems with the simulated active missile threat and don't normally train against launch-and-leave threats. They also admit they underestimated the training and tactics of the Indian pilots. Indian air force planners never repeated failed tactics and were able to change tactics as opportunities became available, mixing things up and never providing the same tactical "look." Some of the Indian aircraft radars had different characteristics than U.S. pilots had seen on stock versions of the aircraft, including some of the Mirage 2000s.

Neubeck later told Inside the Air Force that USAF�s F-15 pilots faced a combination of superior numbers, skilled pilots, and smart tactics. �That combination was tough for us to overcome,� he said.