Stalingrad or North Africa?

 

I agree with Sarmat, Hitler never intended to rule all of Russia or indeed go beyond the Urals. Hitler has always maintained that the goal was to wage war untill the collapse of the Soviet regime and he never planned for the next plan if his original failed because of ideological reasons.

 

Also, the chance of success of the Germans if they won the battle of NA is higher than those if they won in Stalingrad. I mean even if they won in Stalingrad they still had a gigantic mission of keeping the Russian forces (some 1.5-2 million soldiers excellently equipped and had many veterans) located north and east of the city at bey while conquering the Caucasus which is equally difficult. But a victory in NA would mean popular uprisings in both Egypt and Iraq and maybe even in Russia. Egypt alone had some 100k men and though poorly equipped they can use the lef overs from the Brits. The brits would find it impossible to relief the middle east.

 

Al-Jassas

 

When I was writing about those hypothetical scenarios I meant German victory both in Caucasus and Stalingrad. Only victory in Caucasus would open the gates to the Middle East and force Turkey to ally with Germans.

 

Many would consider Wermacht achievements during WWII just miraculous by themselves considering the casualties of its enemies and the size of the occupied territories.

 

I actually think it's quite surprising that the Nazi Germany was able to conduct such a gigantic war for such a long time considering the strength of its opponents.

 

The end result was that they lost disastrously.

 

 

 

Certainly, the carnage of WW I had it's effect.  However, I do not see the British war effort, 1939-45 as characterized by any lack of enthusiasm.  Strategically, the British and Commonwealth forces strove to operate around the periphery of German/Italian continental position.  This was partly out of a perceived need to avoid the "Sommes and Verduns," etc.  Partly it was because there was no continental brideghead as there had been in France in the first war.  Everything had to be done at a distance.

 

The British approach was at odds with the US approach and led to all sorts of strategic-military politics that had to be smoothed over before Overlord was decided upon.  Churchill still envisioned a "soft underbelly" through south Europe (Italy and the Balkans), but the US (Roosevelt and G. Marshall) saw a direct assault on the continent as the best way to confront Germany and to drive into central europe before the USSR got too far west.  Once the plan was put in motion, the British and Canadians were ready to go.

 

If there was any "lack of enthusiasm," it may have been shown by the French in 1940.  That is not an indictment.  The French in the first war lost twice the troops Britain and the Commonwealth did, and most of them were Frenchmen.

 

 

I agree completely.

 

Pikeshot,

 

Please note that the totality of the clear  pattern of avoiding direct confrontation at the strategic and operational levels, even when the need legitimate, demonstrates the British approach to WWII that Sarmat and I are referring to.  

 

 

Britain was complitely able to open a limited theater in Europe should it wanted t. But, of course, that would require a much more bigger effort and concentration and, most importantly, casualties than largely insignificant operations in North Africa.

 

So, in terms of capabilities, of course, Britain could do that, but it didn't see the reason why it should, nor was it willing to suffer extra casualties.

 

LOL!

 

What a pile of ill-informed rubbish.

 

The most effective German units always on the Eastern Front from 1941? Really? So the myriad Fallschirmjager Divisions, 1st SS, 2nd SS and various others are not effective?

 

Where would they have opened a second front in Europe on their own?

 

Dieppe proved that British amphibious doctrine, though heading in the right direction, was flawed and needed a great deal more experimentation, not too mention the specialist equipment that was developed for Normandy. Britain also lacked a cohesive airborne froce till 1943, another pre-requisite for a successful landing.

 

Till 1943/44 the Germans still were able to put considerable air power above Western Europe and the British would not have been able to project air superiority over Europe to protect an invasion.

 

The British also had a distinct lack of landing craft, these simply would not arrive in the needed numbers till 1943.

 

But the whole point is WHY would they launch a limited landing against occupied Europe if they did not have the resources to procure it and use it as a means to end the war, as was Normandy?

 

It would have been a pointless waste of men and material that could be better used elsewhere.

 

I wouldnt let your anti-British sentiment influence your statements so much if I was you.