the Germans who's army was still a mediocre force made mostly of raw recruits.
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I don't think so - read something more about the way Reichswehr transformed into Wehrmacht.
Reichswehr was in fact a mini-Wehrmacht, which only needed to be enlarged and equipped.
The Germany's army yet in 1939 was the best trained army in the world.
The Polish campaign was badly mismanaged by Polish generals.
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Yes, there were huge mistakes commited, but it didn't have a major influence on the course of the war - as some other events which took place had. It only made victories in some battles easier for the enemy.
The generals had enough time and resources to mount a successfull defense against the Germans
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Surrounded from three sides, outnumbered, outgunned ?
Where - along the borders of the country ? - I don't think so.
Along the big rivers? - then Hitler would capture what "was his" and say "thank you".
In Romanian Bridgehead? - yes, but not since the beginning of the war, because Romanian Bridgehead was only around 10% of the territory of Poland - the Poles couldn't simply leave 90% of their territory without combat (including the capital city) for the Germans, and defend in the remaining 10% of territory just because it was the easiest area to defend there successfully.
The Polish commanders didn't even plan to defend along the borders for a very long time.
The whole Poland had got ammunition only for 2 - 3 months of war. Factories were not able to provide enough supplies during the wartime.
Poland could defend much longer but only with help of Western Allies - especcialy supplies.
And only if the Soviet Union did not strike on 17th of September.
The Poles couldn't win alone, and this was actually never the case of the
Polish defensive plan (the Polish defensive plan - Plan "Z" - was not
considering a way to victory, but a way to resist as long as possible -
the Poles counted on the French offensive on the Western front).
Poles were not so stupid and knew that they cannot hold the borders
being attacked from three sides on over 1600 km long frontline - the
only reason why the first Polish defensive lines were established along
the borders was to show the world that they defend every part of their
country.
The Poles were afraid that if they establish they first defensive lines
along the biggest rivers (Vistula, Narew, San) - the Germans would
capture Greater Poland ("Posen Province"), Silesia, Pomerania - and say
"thank you - we took what is ours - now you can vegetate without own
heavy industry, resources (Silesia) and without own entrance to the
see".
It could happen even before the Western Allies declare war to Germany, if the borders were not defended.
After the battles at the borders the Poles planned to withdraw towards
the lines of big rivers (Vistula, Narew, San) and then towards the
Romanian Bridgehead - when they planned to resist until spring of 1940.
Of course they planned to constantly slowing down German advances
during this withdrawal - and later to defend for some time along the
lines of big rivers - and to make some counterattacks.
The Polish commanders, however, underestimated the speed of the German
armoured forces. They also thought that the German armored forces are
not able to hold terrain during nights - and will be withdrawn during
nights from the frontline to safe places. That is why they thought that
even if the Germans break through the Polish defensive lines, they will
not be able to rush into the Polish positions deeper than for 50 - 100
kms before the sunset - and then they will have to be withdrawn. If not
- they will be destroyed during the night by the Polish counterattacks,
and routes of withdrawal will be cut off by the Polish sappers.
Unfortunately the Germans managed to find the way to survive inside the
terrain controled by the enemy for the night - during nights tanks were
forming fortificated camps (square formation) in open fields and were
setting fire to the local barns - such a "fortificatd camp" was very
hard to be took by surprise and destroyed by infantry with artillery
and AT weapons.
Defence of Silesia was planned in that way (especcialy areas near
Pszczyna and Kobiór) - the Polish defensive lines in the Pszczyna
region were all one big trap for tanks.
But the Germans didn't manage to defeat the Polish army until 17th of
September - as it is sometimes said. The Poles still had got the
majority of their forces.
The Soviet attack was decisive and it had the biggest influence on the course of that war.
Regardless of the performance of individual units the fact of the matter is the Poles lost the war.
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They lost the war fighting on two fronts - with Germany and USSR, which were cooperating one with another since 17th of September.
Statement that the Polish army was defeated on 17th of September is a myth. When someone analize it carefully he will see that on 17th of September Poland still had got over 1 million strength army - so bigger than on 1st of September (yes - it is true that part of it was encircled by it was encircled by the majority of the German forces and in the part of the frontline which was of second-importance for the further defence of Poland).
This map (made by me) is more accurate than the majority of similar
maps that can be find anywhere (maybe there are some mistakes, but its
the first version) - it is showing situation on 16/17 of September,
shortly before the Soviet agression. It is showing German forces
(divisions, brigades and independents regiments) and Polish forces
(divisions, brigades, independent groups and regiments, and some other
units of these bigger ones):
(I used map with modern-day borders to make it - no matter cause its test version only):
Yellow-coloured divisions and brigades at the Bzura battle are those
which broke through the Bzura line and later broke through to Warsaw
and to Modlin after the battle in Puszcza Kampinoska:
Of course there were no 12 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry brigades in
the Bzura pocket as German sources sometimes clime (which was - by the
way - not closed by the Germans yet on 17th of September):
Germans engaged most of their forces in the Bzura battle and the
battles of Warsaw, Modlin and Puszcza Kampinoska as can be seen in the
map. Untill those battles ended, they couldn't move these forces
anywhere (for example - to the south-eastern front - which was much
more important if they wanted to defeat Poland).
So the battle of Bzura - although it ended with the Polish defeat (it
lasted untill 22nd of September - and the battle in Puszcza Kampinoska
untill 24th of September) - it was strategical Polish succes (because
it was engaging for such a long time, so many German forces - which
could be send to any other - more important - areas of the frontline).
But the Soviets helped them since 17th of September, so they didn't have to move there their main forces.
And here the same map with marked advances of forward Soviet units
untill the evening of 19th of September (and blue arrow shows probable
Soviet escapade in strength of at least one battalion towards Zamość on
19th - 20th of September):
And here is the area of Romanian Bridgehead where marschal Rydz-Śmigły
- before the Soviet Agression happened -, planned to concentrate all
forces (as many units as possible) and defend against the Germans
untill Spring of 1940:
Romanian Bridgehead was a mountain-highland, very forrested area with
lots of natural obstacles (for example - rivers), with very bad roads
(when it rained a lot - like in Poland during Autumn -, there was a lot
of mud and roads were practically blocked for motorized vehicles).
Soviets invaded without declaring war on 17th of September (around
midnight during the night from 16th / 17th of September) by surprise,
and captured almost 3/4 of this area before 19th of September ended:
On 17th of September when first messages from the new frontline reached
Headquarters of the Polish Army (located near Stanisławów) - marschal
Rydz-Śmigły at first wanted to declare war to the USSR, but after this
initial decision and after three following meetings with most important
Polish officers and members of Government - under influence of fatal
news from the frontline (news about terrible Soviet superiority in
numbers and equipment) - he decided - in the late afternoon of 17th of
September - to give his famous order to all units: "Don't provoke
Soviets to fight and withdraw to Romania, defend only if the Soviets
attacks first, try to negotiate with them if possible".
French embassy in Poland - general Louis Faury - on 16th of September
1939 considered these plans as possible to realize and sent a message
to Gamelin telling this. He also promised to general Stachiewicz that
the French general offensive in the West
will start on 21st of September 1939.
He explained that the French general offensive will start on 21st of
September (not on 17th / 18th of September as was previously said),
because of mobilizational problems and problems with combat-readiness
and concentration of some units.
First allied supplies of equipment, ammunition and weaponry for Poland
reached Romanian ports in Constanza and Galati on 16th of September
1939 - Polish envoys were send to Romania on that day to receive them.
I think that if not the Soviet agression of 17th of September - and if
France and Britain attacked Germany with all their forces on 21st of
September as Louis Faury promised on 16th of September - this war could
end even in 1939 or at the beginning of 1940.
Because if not the Soviet agression, Poland
would hold much longer (at least several weeks longer) than it happened
in reality - especcialy that allied supplies through the sea and across
Romania (by train) to Romanian Bridgehead were just coming.
When Poland
was invaded by the
Soviet Union all ships with supplies were stopped, and some of them
were sent to Constantinople for Turks (Britain hoped that Turks can be
its allies against Germans and against the Soviet Union - because there
was a possibility of war with Soviet Union, there were even British
plans of attacking the Soviet Union - in the future stages of the war).
Edited by Domen - 28-Nov-2008 at 23:45