Mongols versus Western Europe post-1241

 

But I have to say that Beibars indeed was the actual Mameluk commander in battle. Qutuz was "the commander in chief" of course; but the actual tactical command was administered by Beibars.

 

 

Kitbuga and his Mongol army, a small detachment of about 10,000 men, were lured into a trap at ʿAyn Jālūt (“Spring of Goliath”), near Nazareth, in Palestine, by a much larger Mamlūk force commanded by Baybars. The Mongols were destroyed, and Kitbuga was captured and killed. The Mamlūk victory was followed up by Muslim Syria, which then drove out its Mongol garrisons. Hülegü was unable to take reprisals, as he was preoccupied with an internal struggle for power within the Mongol empire, forcing him and much of his army to return to inner Asia. The Mongol empire was thus contained in Iran and Mesopotamia, leaving Egypt secure in Muslim Mamlūk hands.

 

Now this doesn't mean that the wars with the golden horde didn't have an effect, they did but it was a temporary one, just enough for Baibars to consolidate power and reorganise his empire. Al-Maqrizi in his history mentions detailed letters between him and Berke about cooperation against Hulegu and mention that the action did help delay the mongol revenge but he maintains that such help wasn't as dicisive as you portray.

 

Al-Jassas

 

I thought the thread died when last I posted but it seems I missed alot.

 

First, about your theory sarmat that mongols had no intention of ever expanding to egypt, then why the messengers in the first place? All historians of the period agree that kitubga send messengers demanding surrender of the Mamlukes and under the full support of Hulegu himself. Those messengers were hanged on the gate of Zuwailah and an army was massed to attack them. Kitubga attacked Mamluk lands in Palestine before even a formal declaration of war.

 

Second, mongols never withdrew from Syria, they were defeated and kicked out. They had at least three tumens and we know the names of at least two guys who had the rank noyan one was Kitubga and another I forgot his name with a third unidentified man. Of course not to mention the 6 thousand Georgians and 10 thousand Armenians who were with the mongols in Syria and the Ayubid princes of Aleppo and Hims (if I am not mistaken) who joined the mongols with their armies and fought to death. It took Hulegu with at least 100k men and allies two years to complete the conquest of Syria with huge loss of life and the loss of at least 1 tumen in battle with Bedouins. Syria was a rich country and much more suitable for horse based mongol armies than Iraq. Now how after so much loss he would just abandon his conquests just like that? He tried and failed at least once in his lifetime to revenge what happened which contradicts your argument.

 

Finally, the Sons of Hulegu lead at least 6 devastating campaigns against the Mamlukes and gathered for them more troops than they did against the golden horde, that makes the mamlukes irrelevent especially that Maragha, the Ilkhanid capital, was just under 300 Km away from the nearest Mamluk outpost while it was nearly double that distance just from the frontier with the golden horde?

 

Al-Jassas

 

The Mongols could be defeated in Chalons like the Western Europeans did with the Huns, which was almost the same tactics of the Mongols... maybe!!! 

 

I disagree that the Americans were constrained by public opinion, because American public opinion only tends to turn negative after it becomes obvious that a military adventure is failing. By the late '60s, the American people rightly percieved that trying to maintain an unnatural status-quo in South Vietnam (which is the only way I can think of to describe the goal of the campaign) was not worth the human and material resources being expended. The Mongols were in a similar position with regards to their westernmost campaigns - it would have been nice to succeed, but they weren't about to let these missions take precedence over other commitments. If Batu Khan had told his men, "forget the khuriltai, we haven't subdued Albania yet!", I have no doubt his army (essentially, public opinion) would have left him to attack Albania alone.

- It was said by many that Mongols retreated because Ogodei died. May be so. But Ogodei was no young man. He was over 50. If he was to live longer, it could not be much longer. And if Western Europe was to be conquered it would be certainly a tougher nut to crack than Hungary or Poland. Therefore if Ogodei's death triggers the end of their western adventure, they wouldn't be able to conquer Europe entirely. They just don't have the time to organize the campaigns and to fight the necessary battles.

- Hungary and Poland were significantly less fortified and arguably less populated than important parts of Western Europe in the 13th century. We know that Mongols successes in their European campaigns were impressive but not flawless and complete: they had casualties, there were some indecissive skirmishes the historians still argue about their significance, there were fortifications which were not overrun (some were conquered by tricks like feign retreats, some weren't conquered at all).

- Resources and logistics. Based on what I know of Mongols in Europe, I don't see the Mongol campaign able to achieve this goal. Their centers of power in Central Asia were way too remote and no center of power they established in Europe seems strong enough to support such a lengthy and costly adventure.

- Another key aspect in their success in Poland and Hungary is the element of surprise which would be drastically diminished after 1242 if they were to persist in their pressure on the West.