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QuoteReplyTopic: Goldstone (1998) East and West in the 17th century Posted: 04-Apr-2008 at 02:33
Goldstone Jack A. (1988) East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 30/1, 103-142.
Too Eurocentric: they assume that the West
was the epicentre of a crisis due to the rise of capitalism and of the
modern state (Marx and Weber). Significantly, the crisis seems to have
had more consequences in the East than in the West. The simultaneity of
the English revolution, the Anatolian turmoil and the end of the Ming
is not either merely casual: behind all of these events lay a common
causal framework rooted in a wide-ranging ecological crisis (104). The author intends to note certain cogent similarities that make comparative analysis possible (105).
Early modern states faced common
constraints; they needed: 1) sufficient revenue for their army and
their administration, 2) sufficient allegiance from the elite, 3)
sufficient stability for production to occur. Demographic growth and
inflation endangered the equilibrium reached during the 16th century.
The end of a virtuous cycle started in the late 14th century
During the 16th century, population growth had accelerated (less diseases, better climate).
+70% for rural Asia Minor and +200% in urban areas in 1500-70; +700% for Istanbul 1520-1600.
Chinese population from 65m late 14th century to 150m late 16th century.
England from 2m in 1520 to 5m in 1640; London from 50k in 1500 to 400k in 1650.
But agricultural productivity didnt follow that quick pace.
In Anatolia, cultivated acreage increased by 20% in 1500-1570 (decline of productivity per capita).
In China the amount of land under cultivation rose of 50% from the
late 14th to the mid-17th century (average acreage per head tilled by
33% from 1480 to 1600).
The result of this hiatus was emigration, changes in diet (lower
standard of living) and change in landholding structure (which in turn
fed proto-industry). After 1650, these trends reversed population
declined and agriculture expanded (England even managed to export
grain).
A price revolution, the 1500-1650 great inflation
Braudels vision is that import of silver from the Americas in the 16th century depreciated currencies. But:
The equation that relates money supply and prices is MV
= PQ, where M is the money supply, V the velocity of circulation of
money, P, the price level, and Q the quantity of goods and services
marketed. A direct relationship between the money supply and the price
level occurs therefore only when the velocity of circulation and the
quantity of goods marketed are either constant or change in the same
proportion. But in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries
monetary velocity changed rapidly relative to economic output (108).
And, monetary velocity did increase during
the period; urbanization, multiplication of rural markets and deepening
of division of labour induced a faster turnover of species. The
extensive use of credit by merchants and governments and the debasement
of money had the same effect.
Demographic growth increased demand, while
supply grew modestly creating an import pressure on the prices; from
1500 to 1650, there was 500% inflation, in the mean time, the stock of
silver in England only rose of 33%. There was a monetary famine
(development of copper coinage).
If inflation had been caused by American
silver imports, the governments would have re-valuated their currency
they debased them instead. Besides, inflation stopped after 1650, but
not precious metals flows.
Fiscal decay
Due to inflation, the fiscal systems and the military systems linked to it were destroyed:
Collapse of the timar system in Turkey, the central army takes
more importance (burden of cash payment, rebellion if salary doesnt
cope with inflation, budget deficit), and lands and tax-collecting
become private. Contrarily to what has been argued before, trade with
the west doesnt seem to be the reason for the Ottoman fiscal crisis.
Extraordinary taxes became ordinary revenue, but the unfairness of the
tax-farmers and the ability of large landowners to escape taxes fuelled
rebellion.
In China, the lija system, also collapsed. Unable to pay
their equipment, the wei-so military families lose their strategic
importance. Early Ming taxes were paid in goods, but were converted in
silver (ex. Chang Chu-cheng 1572-82). There too central government was
enable to enforce taxation. As governments deficit rose, the
provinces gentry had to rely on its own means to survive and became
semi-independent, preventing the state to increase its revenues. The
author refuses to consider the import of European silver as a cause of
the Mings decline. Rice shortage were much more important for
inflation (116). The critical problem was that rising military costs collided with a decreasingly effective tax system.
The English Revolution too started by a financial crisis, after
the government had exhausted its asset and credit (no loan guaranteed
on taxes since 1620s). The king depended on an alienated Parliament for
new taxes. The king had to resort to hidden taxation (monopolies,
special levies, sell of offices). In the 1630, the crown was living on
credit during peacetime and couldnt afford a single war. The Scottish
rebellion was only the last stroke (119): the inflation eroded
their [the Stuarts] the value of their revenues, while the growing
wealth of landlords remained beyond their grasp.
The elites increasing social frustration Population growth (more surviving offspring dispersing the elites
wealth) and rising prices (more burden for the conservatives, more
incomes for the entrepreneurs) led to an increased social mobility.
Overall, there was an emergence of additional claimants (120).
In the Ottoman Empire, the alliance between the mighty janissaries
and the local elite created a new class: the ayans. The repaid turnover
of the government official made the administrative efficiency decline.
The rising number of gentry members created a fierce competition for
the official position; this led to the emergence of factions defying
the sultan occasionally.
Inflation forced the Chinese magnates to concern themselves more
with profit-making than with administration. Class divisions became
blurred as some commoners got gentrified. Alienated elite became
semi-autonomous and often supported peasants rebellion against the
taxman. The bureaucratic chaos was general.
In England, as the Crown sold its lands, newcomers accessed to
elite statute. They grew bitter against a government unable to give
them jobs.
The student population (coming from nouveau riches families)
skyrocketed, but the impoverished palace couldnt possibly employ them
all. Education
In Turkey and in China the traditional education system was burst
to pieces by the increasing number of students, the quality declined.
Connection and wealth became more important than merit to build a
career. Often, futureless students and low-ranking official joined
bandits or peasants rebellions.
The expansion of Oxbridge marked the decline of traditional elite
household education. The embittered elite drifted to political
radicalism.
Frustrated and literate masses welcomed heterodox religious
movements. Predicators carried the intellectual torch to the masses (129). These highly politic currents endangered the ideological bases of the governments. Religion
Radical Puritanism, Tai-chou
neo-Confucianism and to a lesser extend Sufi dervishes stressed mens
intrinsic worth and intended to purify religious practice and public
and private morals. Elites were seduced by these ideas which offered a
framework to understand the disordered society.
The Tung-li and Fu She academies (reformist
and equalitarian Confucians) and Puritans alike lost instantly their
political influence as soon as the social peace returned with the
Manchu and the Stuarts restoration.
No popular uprising
Weak central government and disaffected elite paved the way for the
impoverished landless peasants. But these rebellions were generally led
and structured by semi-autonomous gentry, unpaid deserters and
futureless students.
The 1590s-1650s rebellions known as the celali revolts were in general backed by ex-soldiers turned bandits and local magnates seeking independence from Istanbul.
The English Revolution is paradigmatic of a elitist and urban rebellion.
The Yang-tze bond-servants revolts are maybe the main counter-example of this trend as it was both anti-Ming and anti-gentry.
Conclusions:
The seventeenth-century crisis are not autonomous causal factors, but aspects of an integrated; multifaced process (131).
The ideological differences governing state
reconstruction after the seventeenth-century crises profoundly
influenced the later divergence of East and West (132). As
England, heir of the Puritan messianic ideology, adopted a dynamic
culture to reach its imperial destiny. By contrast, China and Turkey
adopted a cyclical point of view; orthodox and conservative
institutions were to be recreated to return to the Golden Age. As a
result they turned inward and eschewed novelty (133).
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