Top 100 Generals

Temujin my friend, after reading through your post, I can tell your heart is really not in this �defence� of Frederick.

So comparing Zhukov and Frederick makes Frederick look good how, exactly?

Marlborough�s troops were devoted to him because he genuinely cared about them. His was affectionately known as �Corporal John� amongst his men because of the lengths he went to, to look after their welfare. He was known to give tired troops a ride in his carriage, and his one truly original military innovation was the design of a lightweight wagon to facilitate rapid supply of essentials. In his epic forced march across Europe to the Danube, he lost only about 500 men in total to straggling, disease and desertion (compared with Hannibal, who lost most of his army marching over a similar distance (sorry couldn�t resist )). Marlborough never threw the lives of his men away in pointless, no hope attacks and they knew it.

Wellington, I grant you, is well known for his alleged distain of his men; the famous �Scum of the Earth� speech is perhaps the most misquoted of his sayings. Everyone always omits the end part, where he says ��and look what fine fellows we have made of them!� Wellington may not have liked his men, nor they him, but he respected their abilities and took care to ensure they arrived for battle fit, well supplied and ready to fight, and they respected his abilities as a commander.

Nice try at fudging the issue with your accusations of nationalistic bias, (at which I really ought to take umbrage ), but in Frederick�s case, the facts speak for themselves.

Incidentally, I�m currently reading a very interesting book on the Peninsular War, written mainly from French and Spanish sources/perspectives as well as British, so when I�m done I�ll see what can be done to uphold Wellington�s currently (unfairly) battered reputation. Watch this space!

Intriguing. When did Frederick have a change of heart? In 1749 he issued directives enabling regimental commanders to torture their men to death if they felt it would be necessary to instil yet more fear into the men; Prussian officers were renowned for beating their men for the slightest misdemeanour and towards the end of his life he awarded the order of the Black Eagle to an officer who he knew full well to be a sadistic monster, because he had instilled the required amount of �discipline� to his men. Yes, before you start, there were hangings, shootings and floggings in the British army, but such punishments were used sparingly, and in a legalistic framework for specific offences, and by Wellington�s time, only for the most serious military crimes, not just to instil discipline.

Already posted an answer to the first part of this but; Frederick was asked to release Brunswick to take over the Army of Observation by King George; it was never Frederick�s idea, and he was reluctant to let him go at first. I agree Frederick�s enemies never tried to combine against him effectively, over and above a few instances of cooperation [France and the Reichsarmee, and the Austrians and Russians you mentioned]. The allies never had a commander-in-chief to co-ordinate their efforts and this gave Frederick another massive advantage throughout.

I was referring to the abandoning of lessons learned in America by the British army, following the adoption of Dundas� �Prussian� drill manual. Out went integral skirmisher companies in infantry battalions and light infantry/rifle regiments, out went the two deep line formation [temporarily], out went comfortable, practical clothing, out went the closer relationship between officers and men, paternalism as opposed to punishment, etc.

Since you bring up the subject of the Freikorps, you must know these units were a standing joke at the time. Those that did not desert or turn to banditry were regularly thrashed by their Austrian Pandour and Croat opponents. Their finest hour came when Prince Henry�s army managed to beat the Riechsarmee at Freiburg, with a force largely composed of the best remaining Freikorps units in 1762. The Riechsarmee, as you know, was universally accepted as being the very worst army in Europe at the time.

Fair point. He, like Gustavus Adolphus and Marlborough in their turn, �re-introduced� shock tactics into the mounted arm in Western Europe, and went slightly further, advocating a charge at a full gallop over a long distance; his famous Cavalry Column attack. He, like Marlborough, also used his artillery aggressively and increased the numbers of howitzers to provide close fire support to his infantry, when they had declined in quality later in the war. His most important �invention� was that of fully mounted horse artillery that could keep up with his cavalry. It must be remembered however that his infantry �declined� in quality mainly because of the fact he squandered his men in futile suicidal attacks.

Past performance is no guarantee of current ability. The Spartan army was considered the best in Greece until Leuctra, the French army of Louis XIV was considered the best in Europe, until Marlborough defeated it. The Prussian army was considered the best in Europe until Jena. This is not really a valid argument about Austria.

Bunzelwitz? The Russians got bored with the siege and when Frederick left, Loudon seized Schweidnitz and all of Frederick�s supplies, forcing him to evacuate southern Silesia, a disaster caused by Frederick, who only put four battalions into the place as a garrison.

I was saving the War of the Bavarian Succession/First Partition of Poland for later. Besides, it�s impolite to kick an old man when he�s down and his army has fallen apart at the seams.

I found these interesting quotes about the Pennisular War from the link

http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/cruel_war_in_Spain.html

The French had great difficulties with communicating with each other, it resulted slower concentration of troops. Napier writes: "..the French could never communicate with each other nor combine their movements, except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts; whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by telegraph an advantage equal to a reinforcement of 30,000 men." (- Napier p 129)

Wellington writes: "The French armies have no communications and one army has no knowledge of the position or of the circumstances in which the others are placed, whereas I have knowledge of all that passes on all sides." Scores of vital messages failed to get through and, for example, hardly any of the correspondance between King Joseph and Marmont reached destination, with the result that, the marshal was unaware that Joseph' Army of the Centre was en route to join him, and, consequently, went ahead and fought the Battle of Salamanca with 15,000 men less than he might have had.

Likewise, on a number of occassions, Wellington owed his salvation to the intelligence role of the guerillas. Gates writes: "Immediately after Talavera ... [Wellington] confidently marched off to attack what he believed to be only 10,000 French troops with a force of 18,000-strong. In fact, the Imperial 'detachment' consisted of three entire army corps and numbered well over 50,000 men. Had Wellington not received a timely warning of his miscalculation from the guerillas, it is extremely probable that in the ensuing battle both he and the British army would have ceased to be active factors in the scenarios of the Peninsular war. As it was, he was able to retreat in time." (- Gates, p 35)
"If Moore's operations were being conducted with a sure grasp of the positions and intentions of the enemy, it was in large part due to the guerillas' capture of large numbers of French couriers." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War" p 148)

After reading this quote, can anyone seriously consider Wellington as a good general in the top 20? The guerrillas saved his skin and reputation more than once.

I ask you again, does Wellington deserve to be called a good general?

Nothing short of brilliance on Wellington's part.  Taking advantage of an opponent's weakness is essential to victory.  Even if it was a multitude of weaknesses or disadvantages the enemy had.  Every commander from any war in any era has an opponent that has a weakness.

I find it strange you appear to feel Wellington somehow �cheated�. Is it a sign of poor generalship to make the best use of the weapons you have at your disposal? Should Wellington have ignored the information he was given because it gave him an �unfair� advantage? Given some thought I suspect we could find 9 factors for each general on this list that gave him particular advantages over his enemies.

All generals receive information and intelligence from a variety of sources during the course of military operations, and there are many examples throughout history of commanders ignoring significant information to their cost; Dupont, for example, had plenty of light cavalry available to use for reconnaissance that would have told him the true situation at Bailen. He chose not to use this tool and lost spectacularly as a consequence. Sorry, but your argument appears both naive and without basis, in my opinion.

I�d like to ask a counter question, how would the Spanish have fared without Wellington �s Army?

Spain�s mountains, picturesque as they undoubtedly were, posed no obstacle to French forces when they chose to move through them. Large parts of Spain are flat or rolling open plains that are no impediment to manoeuvre as demonstrated so ably by Napoleon in 1809.

Spanish guerrillas were not as effective or decisive as Spanish romantic propaganda likes to make them out to be. Many were merely bands of deserters, the disaffected and professional bandits who preyed on the French, British and even the Spanish. Guerrillas on their own never won a pitched battle nor prevented any French operational movements. In fact the French had become very adept at dealing with such groups in the areas they controlled. By the time Napoleon invaded Spain himself, the original Army of Spain had become battle-hardened veterans in �counter�insurgency� style operations.

The Spanish national uprising is also largely mythical in terms of being a mass popular insurrection against the French imposed King. In fact �Patriot� Spain was a patchwork of competing, mutually antagonistic Juntas composed of local churchmen and dignitaries of the old regime, and various nobles pursuing their own interests and parochial agendas. Most Spaniards were indifferent to the regime change, hated the idea of military service, and welcomed peace and stability from whatever source.

Given time, the French would have crushed the local militias and guerrilla bands one by one and made accommodations with the Juntas to finally pacify Spain under Joseph Bonaparte. Spain was incapable of putting up a coordinated, cohesive response against Napoleon. Wellington denied the French the time they needed to consolidate their hold on Spain.