If one asks whether the psychological effects of U.S. air operations (against specific military and military-related strategic targets) during the Korean War helped to persuade the Communists to negotiate an early end to the conflicts on terms acceptable to the United States, the answer is probably "no." Considerable American escalation (both actual and threatened) was required to extract relatively modest concessions from both the Communists. The failure to achieve this goal can be attributed to many factors, including the self-imposed humanitarian constraints on its air operations.
However, those air operations against enemy deployed forces were much more successful in demoralizing the enemies, causing the subsequent disintegration of cohesion and the collapse of battlefield resistance:
September-December 1950 in Korea, when North Korean resistance collapsed and the vast majority of North Korean prisoners were taken
April-June 1951 in Korea, when Chinese resistance significantly weakened and units surrendered en masse
December 1951-July 1953 in Korea, when no breakdowns in communist resistance occurred and when few North Korean and Chinese troops surrendered or deserted
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