QuoteReplyTopic: What if the Japanese had won at Midway? Posted: 14-Sep-2007 at 13:26
ConstantineXI,
The whole debate migrated from the land of the plausible to the realm of inanity when you brought uo the thing about moving the whole population inland. That would be impractical and suicidal, not to mention against Australian interests. As for manpower, well locals obviously, but they could ship whole boatloads of Koreans if needed.
babyblue, I agree that collaberation exists in all nations. As a rule of the thumb, 10 % will for sure be bought, another 10 % will activly oppose the occupation, the rest will sit tight and go which way the wind is blowing.
The Japanese win at Midway? No way! It was a bold move to sail the whole fleet towards Australia and hope to catch the Yanks unaware, but after Pearl Harbor and other losses any major move immediately came under American suspicion. The Americans did not have the same numbers of ships but had better trained captains and crew motivated by hunger for revenge.
In regards to the issue of occupying Australia, I would have to side with Constantine XI. I think Sparten and others are forgetting the significance of racism. We all know of the french collaborators, however, the french and germans are both european. To a lesser extent it was the same thing with the eastern european peoples. Constantine XI will have to clarify this for me but I get the impression the australians of the world war II era were as racist as the americans. That being the case the chance of the australians collaborating with the, "barbaric mongoloid race" as the americans certainly viewed the japanese, are extremely unlikely even at 10%. Especially when you consider the superiority complex of the white europeans, having gotten to know people of that generation besides family I can tell you that the chance of them collaborating in any way at all is non-existent. If racism isn't an enormous issue then I would have agreed with Sparten in regards to collaboration, but it is and that makes such an enormous difference.
In regards to partisan activity in Russia, it was an ENORMOUS help to the soviets. Reading histories and especially memoirs of german generals, you read that the germans would be opening new operations against the soviets with hitler the driving force behind that while at the same exact time the major bridges and railways throughout occupied Russia would still be lying in ruins and utterly useless after MONTHS in german control. For one thing the germans didn't have the manpower to repair all these railways and also the partisans would just keep destroying them if repaired.
Again I ramble on, hope that isn't too repetitive.
Edit: I just realized I forget to answer the main question.
Midway was a major victory for the americans that gave them the initiative for the rest of the war, similar in that regards to Kursk on the eastern front for the soviets. If the Japanese had won I would say the war would have lasted longer and the death toll would have been considerably higher, though the americans would have just kept building up the fleet and eventually the japanese would have been overwhelmed. I don't think the japanese could have realistically taken hawaii, the logistics involved and I would imagine the intensity of resistance would have made it untenable. Though a major concern for the americans was the loyalty of the hawaiian population because of japanese immigration before the war, so that would add an interesting dimension. A breakdown of trust between the soldiers and civilians? I think the civilians would side with the U.S. and that would decide the issue in favor for the U.S. If the japanese were actually able to land troops at hawaii and have enough troops to contest ownership, the americans would hold on until re-enforcements arrived.
God, I thought this post was longwinded before.
Edited by Justinian - 15-Sep-2007 at 01:20
"War is a cowardly escape from the problems of peace."--Thomas Mann
What you stated here is hypothetical. The question of whether
or not the Japs can amass the numbers they needed to conquer Australia
aside, as we're both assuming now that they could, there will always be
collaborators. From what you've said, you obviously think the Chinese
population is more submissive and co-operative to the Japs because they
are racially more similar than between white Australians and the Japs.
I don't find this theory of yours too pallatable...White Russians in
Manchuria also collaborated with the Japs.
The reason for collaboration is because there's obvious
profits to be made. And that happens with every race. Although I don't
doubt that the majority of Australians will take up arms against an
invader, any invader. But there would always be a group of
short-sighted people who thinks they can benefit from collaborating,
once again with any invader.
Actually babyblue, I think the reason the Chinese were more inclined to
submission were historical rather than racial. Looking at China's
history for the century before WWII, it is a continuous story of
foreign violation of sovereignty, domination by the Manchu elite,
followed by collapse into civil war, warlordism, and finally the
invasion of the Japanese. China had had a century of foreign
domination, so naturally a great many Chinese were ready to simply
submit to the latest in a long line of recent tyrants - both foreign
and local. Australia, by contrast, had never been conquered and was a
young nation.
Originally posted by Sparten
ConstantineXI,
The whole debate migrated from the land of the plausible to
the realm of inanity when you brought uo the thing about moving the
whole population inland. That would be impractical and suicidal, not to
mention against Australian interests. As for manpower, well locals
obviously, but they could ship whole boatloads of Koreans if needed.
My claim is not the least bit inane, you could see that if you closely
examine Australia's industry and agriculture. On the east coast it is
feasible to move the population inland hundreds of miles, with the
protection of a major mountain range blocking Japanese advances. Huge
amounts of Australian industry are located inland (e.g. Murray/Darling
Basin, Broken Hill). This is on top of the vast herds of cattle and
sheep in the semi-arid regions which could be made available to feed
fleeing non-combatants. A plan to evacuate non-combatants inland would
be perfectly feasible.
However, you still have not answered my question of where a large
enough Japanese land army is going to come from to effectively conquer
the coastal regions. The IJA only had 4,000 men for the invasion of
Australian New Guinea - not even enough to subdue one major Australian
state capital.
As for the Korean workers, how do you propose the transport vessels
will be kept safe from the diverted US North Atlantic fleet while the
IJN has to engage in such a massive detour from one Australian coastal
city to the next? The truly important Australian urban centres are over
10,000 kilometres away from Japan itself. The IJN was not large enough
to simultaneously guard transports of manual labour, engage Australian
defences along the coast AND fight off USN reinforcements all at once.
RE Justinian:
I think Justinian has hit the nail on the head. Australians were
probably even more racially hostile towards the Japanese than Americans
were. Australia is an island nation - which is very conducive to racism
(just look at Britain and Japan). Australia had lost a division at
Singapore, and the Japanese subjected them to awful treatment labouring
on the Burma-Thailand railway. Australia was also more ethnically
homogeneous than the USA - 90% of the population in WWII was
Anglo-Celtic (i.e. from Britain or Ireland). This figure is even
excluding other Europeans from places like Germany, Holland and France.
Australians loathed the Japanese passionately, and I have listened to
Australians from older generations whose views on the Japanese confirm
this. Any Australian caught collaborating with the Japanese would have
been lynched on the spot.
Another thing to keep in mind regarding collaboration. People in France
and China could be forgiven for thinking the enemy was actually going
to win the war. No one in France at the beginning of 1941 seriously
thought the Third Reich would be gone in four years. So collaboration
was intelligent. No Australian in 1942 could be persuaded to think the
Japanese would win the war, though. A loss at Midway would lengthen the
war, but eventually the US and Britain would shift their forces east
and Japan would be doomed. So who in their right mind would collaborate
with an enemy they know is going to lose in a few years, and then have
to face the wrath of their betrayed compatriots?
What a load of rubbish to say the Australians were hostile to the Japanese! Some people verge on the ridiculous when telling others about history of their own country. The Japanese were always treated well. During the hight of the war "Madam Butterfly" was playing in Melbourne. A midget submarine tried to blow up Sydney Harbor Bridge but was sunk. The Australian Government retrieved the body and sent it back to Japan with full military honors. The Australian Government had done many trade deals with Japan before the war and was the first nation to resume full trade relations after.
During the war, the Japanese treatment of Australians was enough to
make most Australian loathe them. However, just because Japan
mistreated Australian dead and PoWs, that didn't mean we did the same
in return. Australians may have been racist, but that didn't mean we
violated honourable conduct in war. Unlike Japan, we did sign the
Geneva Convention.
As with any 'hypothetical' scenario I would start with
defining 'winning' more precisely. Does that mean that the US carriers
are all sunk?Midway successfully
invaded and occupied?Additional (extensive?)
damage done to the US fleet?What about
Japanese losses?At one point one would
have to question the plausibility of the scenario.Sure, if the Japanese had won very one-sided
victories in every naval engagement then they could have held onto their
conquests indefinitely.However, they
consistently failed to do that.Midway
may have been an extreme result in favour of the Americans (due in part to
breaking the Japanese codes), but Japan failed to achieve a similar extreme
result in their favour against the US after Pearl Harbor.
In terms of simply reversing the result at Midway,
whatever that might mean exactly, it would only delay the inevitable IMHO, not
change it.Japan had simply bitten off
more than they could chew once Germany had been defeated the US, Britain
(plus Commonwealth) and the USSR would be free to concentrate their efforts
against Japan.IMHO Japan was not
capable of establishing an unassailable position in the Pacific, even given a
more successful outcome at Midway and time to exploit it.The US still gets nukes, and once they have
them all they need to do is to get one base within B29 range of Japan and its
all over.Their strategy to win the
war was to take what they wanted, establish a defensive perimeter and then
hold on until the Americans got tired of beating their head against a wall
and agreed to let them keep what they had taken.After Pearl, that simply wasnt going to
happen.In the end it comes down to how
long it would take and how costly it would be to defeat Japan, the outcome wasnt
really in doubt.Japans only hope would
have been for a German victory in Europe, which would eliminate Britain and
the USSR from the equation in the Pacific and pose an additional threat for
the US to be concerned about in the Atlantic.
deadkenny, a complete victory at Midway mirroring the historical US win, would see a very different strategic situation developing one where the US is on the defensive and Japan on the offensive. Even if a US victory was ineveitable, well the new senario gives Japan a lot of options they will not have in real history, so simply declaring that the same would have occured plus six months is not the way to go.
Even if say the Japanese chose not attack further into the "US Sector", they had other options. We have already discussed Australia ad nauseum, they could have relaunched their offensive in the Indian Ocean (and this would have complicated matters for the Allied Forces in N Africa and India), or perhaps been able to enter the war against the USSR by staging that attack on Vladivostock, that Hitler had hoped for, with the Russian fronts in complete collapse in the Caucasus it would seem to Japanese planners the most oppurtunistic time to do so, Zhukov and his Siberians were safely on the other side of Eurasia. Or even perhaps Yamamoto would have been press ganged into going further against the US.
None of the above are definatly or even likely to be successful, but the point simply is that a victory at Midway opens up a whole new pandoras box and we have no idea what course the war would have taken.
Very good assessment, deadkenny. The Japanese land forces turned out to be better than expected and used brutally effective means of harassing civilians to quickly achieve their goals, but with a navy it's not that easy. They could not sail around just sinking civilian boats to achieve their objectives.
deadkenny, a complete victory at Midway mirroring the historical US win, would see a very different strategic situation developing one where the US is on the defensive and Japan on the offensive. ...
Certainly a very different situation, in the short run. However, the point is that Japan was overextended as it was. They lacked the 'strength', especially in industry and resources, to back up such a victory. So unless one supposes that they continued to win one incredible victory after another, the attrition would catch up with them. While the US could sustain the losses, because they had the 'two ocean navy' ships under construction and the industry and resources to sustain a war of 'attrition'. So my point was simply that the Japanese could not 'win' other than by sustaining a string of increasingly implausible victories over the US. Further, IMHO, Japan was not capable of exploiting any 'short term' opportunities to the extent of achieving a strategically undefeatable position. No doubt you are correct about offensive opportunities opening up for Japan in Australia and / or the Indian Ocean. The Allies would have been forced back onto the defensive for a time. However, there were some advantages to being on defense, with cheaper land based air being able to defend bases against more vulnerable carrier based air. Also, let's also keep in mind that Japan did historically achieve initial victories. They weren't really checked at all in any of their offensives until Coral Sea and then Midway. So a 'reverse Midway' allows further expansion of the Japanese 'perimeter'. But what then? Their principle opponents (or potential opponents) were effectively out of reach of the Japanese (i.e. specifically Britain and the US). So even if Japan had taken Australia for instance, that simply leaves them even more overextended when the US finally does build up sufficient forces for a counterattack.
Regarding the USSR, there are a couple of considerations in particular. Siberia was not as critical to the USSR, as it became later. The bulk of the population, resources and industry of the USSR was west of the Urals. So it is questionable what the USSR would really be losing. It is also questionable what Japan would be gaining, other than another opponent. True, they might hope to make Germany's fight easier. But then if you're going to propose that alternative, wouldn't it have been much more straightforward for Japan to simply have attacked the USSR in the first place, rather than attacking the US, Britain, et al first? Finally, note the beating that Japan took in 1939, and again in 1945. Japan attacking the USSR would be a tough fight for Japan, with little directly to gain, simply in order to 'help' the Germans. Japan having decided to take on the US, Britain and the Commonwealth in a war, it is not very plausible that they would then decide to turn around and attack the USSR before after a naval victory while still at war with those other forces.
As to Midway ,
true, Nagumo could not adjust with the changing tactical situtation, however I
note that this situation was an ambush, brought on by the US knowing extactly
where and when the Japanese were due to code breaking. No naval
commander(Agrippa, Nelson,Perry, etc.) would have faired much better than
Nagumo, even without the problems with the Japanese recon planes at Midway and Yamaguchi's idea of lauching a "half
strike" during the "madness" as he called it, would not have change the outcome
of the battle. IT WAS AN AMBUSH, no-one could have done much better , perhaps
the Japanese might have possibly sunk one carrier with a half strike, (remember
the Yorktown was sunk by a sub), but in the end, the outcome would have been the
same, even worse. They would have lost all four carriers and not taken Midway. The US was far too fortified on Midway and knew the Japanese plan, if anything if
they, The Japanese, had fought longer around Midway , while they might have sunk a US carrier ,
they would have lost their entire landing force and many of the supporting ships
and warships that were part of that force. So again you blame Nagumo for a US
ambush he had no way to avoid, and the alternative is that the Japnese would
have lost alot more if they had pushed the Midway
plan further. Nagumo was lucky to get out of the Midway battle losing only 4 carriers and a cruiser,
your arguements and the arguements of his detractors against his lousy tactical
grasp of the situation, to have done different, would have only increased the
Japanese disaster at Midway.
You know with
this writing, I think I just turned the whole view of how Midway should be viewed "historically" upside down. I
said earlier I wanted to discuss Midway in a new
topic so I am going to split this , since I think it is a "novel idea". Anyway,
I hate putting too much cerebral heavy artillery in one topic, or wasting it on
Pearl HarborAs to Midway ,
true, Nagumo could not adjust with the changing tactical situtation, however I
note that this situation was an ambush, brought on by the US knowing extactly
where and when the Japanese were due to code breaking. No naval
commander(Agrippa, Nelson,Perry, etc.) would have faired much better than
Nagumo, even without the problems with the Japanese recon planes at Midway and Yamaguchi's idea of lauching a "half
strike" during the "madness" as he called it, would not have change the outcome
of the battle. IT WAS AN AMBUSH, no-one could have done much better , perhaps
the Japanese might have possibly sunk one carrier with a half strike, (remember
the Yorktown was sunk by a sub), but in the end, the outcome would have been the
same, even worse. They would have lost all four carriers and not taken Midway. The US was far too fortified on Midway and knew the Japanese plan, if anything if
they, The Japanese, had fought longer around Midway , while they might have sunk a US carrier ,
they would have lost their entire landing force and many of the supporting ships
and warships that were part of that force. So again you blame Nagumo for a US
ambush he had no way to avoid, and the alternative is that the Japnese would
have lost alot more if they had pushed the Midway
plan further. N
Well, Midway wasn't an 'ambush' in the usual sense of that term. The Japanese were threatening Midway in order to draw out the American carriers so as to destroy them. So the Japanese actually hoped / expected the American carriers to be in the area (otherwise, how else would they be expecting to engage and destroy them?). The code breaking only meant that the Amercians were not 'surprized'. The other 'surprize' element in favour of the Americans was that the Japanese believed that the Yorktown had previously been sunk. So the Japanese were operating on a more or less 'even playing field' with the Americans, having failed to 'surprize' them.
I would argue that it was the Japanese plan itself that was flawed. First, the Aleutians diversion effort was simply a waste of resources that could have been better utilized on the main effort. Secondly, the Japanese were putting themselves at a disadvantage by operating close to an enemy airbase (Midway itself). Although land based air can be 'suppressed', it cannot be 'sunk' like a carrier. Finally, the Japanese simply fell victim to poor recon / intel and their own indecisiveness. Interestingly enough, the Japanese had 'wargamed' out their Midway attack and the Japanese carriers had been sunk by the American side in the wargame! The umpire simply 'cheated' and discounted the 'American' attack and continued on with the wargame (to a Japanese side victory of course!). However, the wargame had pointed out the vulnerability of the Japanese in the scenario they had created. In their wargame, as in reality, the Japanese had allowed themselves to become 'fixated' upon Midway, when their primary target needed to be the American carriers. Their carriers should have been allowed only one strike against the airbases on Midway, and then should have switched to hunting the US carriers. The cruisers could have bombarded Midway, and even the battleships could have been brought up later to finish the job. Midway was a poor plan to begin with, and it was 'bungled' badly tactically in the execution. IMHO the 'ambush' / code breaking aspect has been over emphasized at the expense of the other factors that contributed significantly to the Japanese defeat.
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